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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has led to a discussion about the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy at the zero lower bound. One of the proposals that have received
much attention is price level targeting as an alternative to inflation targeting.
Notably, Charles L. Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
joined the ranks of those advocating a “state-contingent price-level target”. Ac-
cording to him, it would help the public’s understanding of the Fed s intentions
in the current situation, if the central bank clearly communicated “an expected
path for prices” (Evans, 2012, p. 147). Blanchard et al. (2013, p. 10) “would al-
low for higher inflation rates without undermining central bank credibility in the
long run”. And more recently, Narayana Kocherlakota, President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, showed some sympathy for price level targeting
(Kocherlakota, 2014).1
The current discussion about price level targeting is linked to the academic re-
search on the long stagnation of the Japanese economy since the early 1990s.
Several macroeconomists have developed new ideas in order to improve the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy at the zero lower bound (e.g. Krugman, 1998;
Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). Svensson (2003) provides a useful summary of
all these suggestions and formulates a “foolproof way to escape from a liquidity
trap”. Svensson lists three conditions for a successful strategy: an upward-sloping
price-level target path, a depreciation and a crawling peg of the currency, and an
exit strategy. The gist of his argument is that communicating an upward-sloping
price-level target path is not sufficient - in addition, depreciation is needed as a
credible commitment to an increase in the future price level, which in turn leads
to a reduction in the real interest rate by changing expectations.
1See Ambler (2009), Bo¨hm et al. (2012), and Hatcher and Minford (2014) for a survey of
the literature on pioneering work on price level targeting. For a thorough discussion of new
approaches to monetary policy see e.g. English et al. (2013).
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This paper tries to make a historical contribution to the ongoing debate about
alternative monetary policy regimes. It discusses Sweden’s monetary policy in the
1930s that is said to have been the first time a central bank has truly adopted price
level targeting. In particular, it asks how the policy of the Riksbank contributed
to the strong recovery of the Swedish economy after the suspension of the gold
standard in September 1931. Against the background of the current discussion, it
seems natural to conjecture a close relationship between price level targeting and
the performance of the real economy. Ending deflationary expectations was one
of the most important conditions for recovery in the 1930s (Eichengreen, 1992).
We agree with the observation that the Riksbank in fact made a crucial con-
tribution to the rapid recovery of the Swedish economy, but we are skeptical of
the view that price level targeting played a crucial role. Our argument has three
parts. First, a close reading of the archival sources suggests that it is far from
certain that the Riksbank truly adopted price level targeting in the first place
(Section 2). In this, we follow Berg and Jonung (1999), but we differ in that
we add new evidence leading us to be even more critical towards the motives of
Riksbank governor Rooth than Berg and Jonung. Secondly, we argue that even if
the Riksbank had adopted price level targeting, it is doubtful whether the mere
stabilization of prices that occurred in Sweden after 1931 was sufficient to end
deflationary expectations. As noted, in today’s discussion price level targeting
refers to a rising path of prices, not to a stabilization of prices as in Sweden’s
official monetary program of 1932. Likewise, in their analysis of the British re-
covery in the 1930s, Crafts and Fearon (2013, pp. 56-57) argue that the credible
commitment to maintaining inflation, not price stability, proved crucial for end-
ing deflationary expectations. Thirdly, our analysis shows that the devaluation
ended deflationary expectations almost immediately and that the quick recovery
of the Swedish economy was mainly driven by the undervaluation of the Swedish
krona after September 1931. It is as Charles Kindleberger suspected almost 40
years ago in his standard reference on the world economic crisis: “the recovery
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represented simple exchange depreciation in excess of that of the pound, plus
spillover from the British building and later armament boom” (Kindleberger,
1973, p. 182).
To measure the effects of the devaluation and to track the change of inflation-
ary expectations, we estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model for a small open economy (Section 4). Despite its relatively simple struc-
ture, this model adequately captures the key dynamics of the factors driving the
Swedish economy in the period under analysis. We show that, by keeping the
krona undervalued, Swedish exchange rate policy enabled Sweden to avoid a much
deeper and prolonged depression. The fact that Sweden escaped from depression
and deflation with the aid of a strong devaluation, but without announcing an
upward-sloping price-level target path, may be relevant for the foolproof way as
suggested by Svensson (2003). For the central bank of a small open economy like
Sweden, it may be sufficient to use exchange rate policy to convince markets of
its resolve to make a fundamental change in its monetary policy.
2 Sweden’s Price Level Targeting
On Sunday evening, September 27, 1931, the Swedish finance minister Felix Ham-
rin announced the temporary suspension of the gold standard and declared that
from now on “monetary policy should be aimed at stabilizing the internal pur-
chasing power of the krona by all means possible”.2 Ten days later, the Board of
the Riksbank decided to ask three renowned Swedish economists, Gustav Cassel,
David Davidson, and Eli Heckscher, to explain “what guidelines should be carried
2Bankoutskottets utl˚atande Nr 40, Bihang till riksdagens protokoll 1932 (May), p. 8: “att
penningpolitiken syntes bo¨ra inriktas p˚a att med till buds st˚aende medel bevara den svenska
kronans inhemska ko¨pkraft”. A complete timeline of relevant events is included in the appendix.
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out for the development of the Swedish monetary system”.3 Another two weeks
later, the responses of the three economists arrived at the Riksbank. They con-
tained very innovative and useful instructions on how to conduct monetary policy
under a floating exchange rate. The Riksbank constructed a weekly consumer
price index in order to have a better picture of the effects of its monetary policy.
Officially, the krona was now on a paper standard, and the Riksbank pursued
price level targeting.
Ever since Hamrin’s declaration in September, 1931, economists have debated the
question whether or not the Riksbank truly abandoned exchange rate targeting
and aimed at stabilizing the domestic price level. Irving Fisher was among the
contemporaries who believed that the Riksbank indeed adopted a new framework.
In his book Stabilized Money (1935) he highlighted the extraordinary stability of
the Swedish price level after September 1931 and pointed out that the Riksbank
“had to make use of much active management” in order make this happen (p.
324). He was also impressed by the communication strategy of the monetary
authorities. “Thus”, he concluded, “for the first time in history, a country an-
nounced its policy would be that of stabilizing its currency, not with regard to
gold or with regard to foreign exchange, but with regard to the internal purchas-
ing power of its money” (p. 320).
There is no doubt that the Swedish price level was stable after September 1931.
For five years, the consumer price index of the Riksbank remained within a band
of ±5 percent (Figure 1). As for the role of the central bank, however, Fisher’s
enthusiastic view was challenged by many contemporary economists, among them
Erik Lindahl who provided a “good-luck interpretation” for Sweden’s price sta-
bility (Lindahl, 1936, p. 95). Brinley Thomas (1936, p. 233) called Fisher’s ex-
planation of the Swedish success a “na¨ıve gospel”, and Richard A. Lester (1939,
p. 279) concluded that the Riksbank behaved as if Sweden were still on a gold
3Sa¨rskilt protokoll, 8 October: “[...] sina synpunkter ang˚aende vilka riktlinjer enligt deras
mening borde uppdragas fo¨r det svenska penningva¨sendets utveckling”.
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standard.
After World War II, economists lost interest in the monetary experiments of the
interwar years as the Bretton Woods system seemed to rehabilitate a system of
fixed exchange rates. But in the 1970s when floating exchange rates became
a viable option, researchers began to rediscover Sweden’s monetary policy of
the 1930s. The pioneer of this rediscovery has been the Swedish economist Lars
Jonung. After publishing two seminal papers in the late 1970s (Jonung, 1979b,a),
he resumed the topic in the late 1990s when inflation targeting had become the
new standard for central banks (Berg and Jonung, 1999; Fregert and Jonung,
2004).
Jonung takes a nuanced view. While stating that the monetary program served
as a guiding principle for the Riksbank’s policy, he detects several deviations from
the official declarations. In November 1931 and again in late 1932 the Board of
the Riksbank tried to restore the old parity with sterling at 18.16 kronor, thus
inducing a period of deflation. Ultimately the attempt to appreciate the krona
failed, but not because its members saw that such a strategy was not compatible
with the goal of price level targeting, but because they lacked the reserves to
maintain the old parity. Jonung also points out that the Riksbank, after pegging
the krona to sterling in the summer of 1933, failed to let the currency appreciate
in late 1936 when the Sweden imported inflation from Great Britain. Figure 1
summarizes the violations of the rules of price level targeting.
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Figure 1: Nominal Exchange Rate SKr./£ and Swedish CPI
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In recent times, Jonung’s pioneering work was followed up and carried further
by Straumann and Woitek (2009). Like Thomas (1936) and Lester (1939), they
argued that the frequent violations of the rules of price level targeting are hard
to reconcile with the claim that the Riksbank was primarily guided by the new
monetary program. Furthermore, they were the first to analyze the original
documents of the central bank and to provide an econometric test. Their analysis
suggests that the Riksbank and in particular governor Ivar Rooth pursued a
traditional approach by aiming at a stable exchange rate against the pound as
the main goal, not as an intermediate target in order to stabilize the price level,
but as the end in itself. Two other recent papers support this skeptical view
(Courne´de and Moccero, 2009; Bo¨hm et al., 2012).
The private letters of Ivar Rooth are particularly illuminating. In late September
1933, he explained to O.M.W. Sprague, professor of economics at Harvard and
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temporary assistant to the United States Secretary of the Treasury:
“My personal opinion is that it is of the utmost importance to the
whole economic life of a nation which like Sweden for its standard of
living is to such a great extent depending upon foreign trade, to have
fairly stable quotations. I think that I dare say that also in order to
get a rising price-level, stable foreign exchanges are better than the
erratic movements of these rates which the world has suffered from
ever since September 1931.”4
Rooth also made it clear to Sprague that a depreciation of the krona resulted
from the need to accumulate foreign exchange reserves after November 1931:
“When we were driven off the Gold Standard in September 1931 we
had less gold than usual and hardly any foreign exchange reserves. As
there was then a stipulation in our law that we were allowed to issue
notes to not more than double the amount of our gold reserve plus
250 million kronor, we could not reduce our gold holdings. In order
to get some hold of the development of the Swedish exchange and the
price level we had to try to build up a foreign exchange reserve. [...]
A consequence of this policy of ours was that on the whole the foreign
exchange quotations rose.”5
In addition, in early 1936 Rooth argued in a letter sent to the Swiss National
Bank that Sweden pegged the krona rate to sterling because most foreign business
was invoiced in sterling:
“It was particularly important for a small country like Sweden de-
pending so strongly on its foreign trade to inspire trade and industry
with trust in our currency.”6
4Archives Bank of England, OV 29/26 (26 September 1933).
5Archives Bank of England, OV 29/26 (26 September 1933).
6Archives Riksbank, Rooth papers, box 93 (correspondence with Swiss National Bank).
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And finally, in a further statement in February 1938, Rooth wrote to Randolph
Burgess, Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York:
“Some American professors, e.g. Professor Irving Fisher, believe that
it is an achievement by us in the Riksbank that prices have been fairly
steady up to the middle of 1936. I have told Professor Fisher before
and I am sorry to have to tell you now that what we have done is
merely that we have carried out a fairly conservative central banking
policy. In fact we have never tried to do anything directly with regard
to prices.”7
In accordance with the new literature on the divergence between words and deeds
in central banking (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger,
2005), these personal letters and other written sources suggest that there was a
gap between the discourse among economists and politicians and the rationale
behind the actions taken by governor Rooth and the Board of the Riksbank.
And interestingly, the price level of Norway was even more stable after Septem-
ber 1931 than the Swedish one, although the monetary authorities in Oslo did
not announce a new policy regime after the suspension of the gold standard in
late September 1931 (Venneslan, 2010). The innovative character of Sweden’s
monetary policy appears to be overvalued.
Most importantly, even if we accept that price level targeting was adopted by the
Riksbank, it is not clear how it was supposed to contribute to the recovery of the
Swedish economy. As Crafts and Fearon (2013) emphasize in their discussion of
the British recovery after the suspension of the gold standard in September 1931,
the announcement of a rising price level was crucial to generating inflationary
expectations. In July 1932, Neville Chamberlain, the British Chancellor of the
Exchequer that ran monetary policy after 1931 announced a price-level target
which aimed to end price deflation and return prices to the 1929 level, and he
7Archives Sveriges Riksbank, Rooth papers, Box 129 (10 February 1938).
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repeated it many times in the next few years. We don’t see a comparable com-
munication by Sweden’s monetary authorities. On the contrary, the May 1932
monetary program as framed by the Banking Committee of the parliament stated
that the Riksbank was supposed to avoid deflation as well as inflation and that
“a targeted recovery of prices was not supposed to go back to a price level that
was too distant.”8 Accordingly, Bo¨hm et al. (2012, p. 14) are right in pointing
out in their discussion of the Swedish case that “[i]t can also be argued that the
transition from the gold standard to price-level targeting (and back) did not rep-
resent a significant change in monetary policy, as the gold standard was de facto
price-level targeting determined by the price of a single commodity - gold”.
For all these reasons, we pursue a different path when analyzing how the Riks-
bank’s monetary policy contributed to the early and strong recovery of the
Swedish economy. In the next two sections, we will try to show that the strong
undervaluation of the krona was the crucial operation which jump-started the
economy and ended deflationary expectations. And archival sources show that
the strong undervaluation did not result from a deliberate policy choice, but from
the need to replenish foreign exchange reserves that determined the Riksbank’s
exchange rate policy. Thus, in the letter to Sprague which we have already cited
above governor Rooth explained that the strong recovery of the economy was an
unintentional effect of the Riksbank’s urgent need for foreign exchange reserves.
After Britain and Sweden suspended the gold standard in September 1931, the
krona was undervalued against sterling, and sterling was undervalued against the
US dollar and the French franc. At the same time the Riksbank followed the
Bank of England in lowering interest rates in the first half of 1932, though only
reluctantly, because it feared a sudden surge of inflation. No wonder, the British
monetary authorities were not impressed by Sweden’s public discussions about
price level targeting. In late 1936, Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank of
8Bankoutskottets utl˚atande, No. 40, May, 1932, p. 18.
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England, made the following observation:
“The Swedes have made a lot of noise about their new monetary policy
of basing the level of the krona on a price index and thus maintaining
the level of prices. In fact they have up till now had to do nothing
but keep pegged on sterling and we have kept their prices steady for
them.”9
3 Explaining the Swedish Recovery
From a comparative perspective, Sweden’s economic crisis in the 1930s was short.
Not only did it start later than in most European countries, it also ended sooner
than elsewhere. In 1930, when countries like Germany and the United States
were sliding into a severe recession, Sweden still enjoyed positive, albeit moder-
ate growth. And in 1933, when the members of the gold bloc under the leadership
of France still had three years of depression before them, Sweden already expe-
rienced the beginning of a rapid recovery. By 1937, when the US barely reached
the level of 1929 in terms of real GDP, the Swedish economy had grown by 25
percent relative to the peak before the crisis. The spurt of the industrial sector
was particularly impressive. In 1937, Sweden’s index of industrial production was
at 152 relative to the level of 1929 while the indices of countries that also enjoyed
a swift recovery, namely Denmark, Norway, and the UK, were 135, 130, and 130,
respectively.
The analysis of the main components of real GDP reveals that the recovery
changed its character over time (Figure 2). In 1932, the improvement of the trade
balance was the only component checking the economic contraction, as exports
declined less than imports (-225.4 mio. and -308.3 mio. SKr. respectively).
The recovery had not started yet, but at least the slide into the depression was
9Archives Bank of England, OV 29/27 (31 December 1936).
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slowed. In 1933, however, the forces of recovery began to be visible in overall
GDP growth (+2.2%), as the trade balance further improved10 and firms began
to invest in new machinery. Yet, since the investment in the real estate sector
continued to decline and consumers were still tightening the belt, GDP in 1932
remained below the level of 1930.
In 1934 recovery was fully under way, as consumption and investment markedly
increased. The strongest stimulus came from the rise of private consumption,
whereas government consumption turned from negative to barely positive. The
Social Democratic government, elected in the autumn of 1932, aimed to pursue a
countercyclical fiscal policy, but obviously failed to mobilize the sums necessary
to provide an additional boost to the economy. In 1935, the Swedish economy
was already near full employment, as private consumption and investment further
increased. Unemployment fell from 9.6 percent in 1933 to 6.2 percent in 1935
(Grytten, 1995). Clearly, Sweden had overcome the depression within three years.
Figure 2: Sweden’s Real GDP, 1932-35
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10More details on the composition of foreign trade during the recovery can be found in the
appendix.
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Sweden’s recovery was influenced by the rising demand of the world economy after
1932. The suspension of the gold standard and the devaluation of the currency
in the UK in September 1931 and in the US in April 1933 marked the beginning
of the end of the crisis at the global level (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985). Yet,
Sweden’s recovery also seemed to be driven by the undervaluation of the exchange
rate. One of the first to bring up the issue of undervaluation was Montgomery
(1938), and in recent times, the issue was reintroduced to a broader audience by
Kindleberger’s question cited in the introduction. The first to study the topic in
a more systematic way was Lundberg (1983). On the basis of purchasing power
parities, he estimated that from 1932 to 1935 the krona was undervalued by 15
percent. He also discussed the question why the undervaluation did not cause
inflation at an earlier stage of the expansion. His answer was twofold. First,
demand elasticity was rather high, i.e. foreign customers of Swedish products
reacted strongly to the lowering of prices after the end of the gold standard in
1931. Second, the access to natural resources (wood, iron ore) was relatively
cheap as domestic producers provided them.
Figure 3: Change in Real Exchange Rate
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Our back-of-the-envelope calculation confirms Lundberg’s finding. We computed
the real exchange rate of the krona against sterling based on foreign and domes-
tic prices and the nominal exchange rate, and as an initial approximation, we
consider only the percentage changes in the real exchange rate. The results in
Figure 3 of this simple exercise are quite clear. Already in 1930, when the nomi-
nal exchange rate was fixed, the Swedish inflation rate was lower than in Britain,
implying a real depreciation of the Swedish currency. The nominal devaluation
in September 1931 then reinforced the real depreciation. The question remains
as to the effects of this depreciation, which we will analyse in detail in the next
section.
Figure 4: Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Riksbank
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A further piece of evidence suggesting a marked undervaluation is the strong rise
of gold and foreign exchange reserves of the central bank. In the first six months
of 1929 (that is, before the beginning of the world economic crisis), Swedish gold
and foreign exchange reserves amounted to 350 million SKr; by the end of 1935
they reached 1,000 million SKr (Figure 4). This increase of reserves was so steep
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that the Bank of England observed in a memo in January 1936 that “. . . the
Riksbank is still holding an abnormally large share of Sweden’s abnormally large
foreign reserves”.
The dramatic improvement in the trade balance after 1931 is another sign that
the Swedish currency was most probably undervalued. In 1931/32, the trade
balance was extremely negative, since Sweden, as a small open economy, was
suffering immensely from the collapse of world trade (Figure 5). By 1933/34, the
trade deficit had disappeared, partly because of the recovery in exports. In 1932,
the worst year of the depression, they amounted to 947 million SKr and two years
later in 1934 to 1,302 million SKr. During the same period, imports increased
by just 150 million SKr, from 1,155 to 1,305 million SKr despite of protectionist
measures by Sweden’s trading partners.
Given that from 1932/33 the UK pursued a protectionist trade policy and that
Germany forced clearing agreements on its trading partners, the strong rise of
exports may come as a surprise. Yet, new research has shown that the Scan-
dinavian countries were able to defend their export interests quite successfully
(Olsson, 2010). It is true that the British turn towards protectionism as estab-
lished at the Ottawa conference in 1932 was a major blow to Sweden s economy,
especially for the timber, pulp and paper as well as the steel industries. Yet,
thanks to tenacious negotiations, Sweden was able to mitigate the negative ef-
fects of British protectionism. In exchange for a higher quota of coal imports
from the UK, the Swedish pulp and newsprint sector was freed of British duties
and the paper and steel industries received a marked reduction of British tariffs.
Consequently, Sweden’s traditional trade surplus with the UK became smaller,
but did not disappear after 1932. Likewise, the agreement with Germany was
relatively favorable. The traditional view that the Nazi government exploited
its smaller trading partners seems to be incorrect. The clearing agreements that
were renewed annually made it possible that Sweden profited from the rising
demand of the German economy (Hedberg, 2010). Sweden’s traditionally high
15
trade deficit with Germany shrank after 1931.11
Figure 5: Current Account Visibles and Invisibles, Sweden
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4 Model and Results
To shed more light on the reasons behind Sweden’s rapid recovery, we use a sim-
ple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in the spirt of Gal´ı
and Monacelli (2005); Monacelli (2005).12 The model is a small open economy
model in the New Keynesian tradition of Clarida et al. (1999, 2000); Woodford
(2003) and incorporates nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. We esti-
mate the model using Bayesian methods and use the model to illustrate that the
11For a broader view of Scandinavia’s position between Germany and the UK see Salmon
(2010).
12Similar models have been used successfully been used among others by Smets and Wouters
(2002); Bergin (2003, 2006); Lubik and Schorfheide (2006, 2007); Ambler et al. (2004); Justini-
ano and Preston (2010a,b); Adolfson et al. (2008, 2007); Burriel et al. (2010); Dib (2011).
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depreciation of the Krona was the key trigger for the recovery.
The model includes households consuming and investing in physical capital, which
is rented out to firms owned by the households. Households have access to a full
set of internationally traded state contingent claims denoted in domestic cur-
rency.13 The domestic intermediate goods sector is characterised by monopolis-
tic competition. Firms rent capital and labor services from the households. A
bundler sells a the final domestic good to the households and an importing firm
imports and sells a composite foreign good. There are shocks to the domestic
currency price of foreign goods, to world demand for domestic goods, and to the
risk sharing condition that allows for deviations from perfect risk sharing. As the
model is fairly standard a more detailed description can be found in an appendix.
To identify the empirical implications of the model, we use monthly data on
industrial production, inflation, the export/import ratio, and the real exchange
rate for the observation period January 1928-September 1939. Based on the
consumer price index published by the League of Nations, we calculated infla-
tion as the seasonal first differences of the price index in logs and then demean.
The real exchange rate data is from the Riksbank, and the export/import ratio
(seasonally adjusted) is from Statistika Centralbyr˚an (1972). Industrial produc-
tion (seasonally adjusted) is from the League of Nations; following Rabanal and
Rubio-Ramı´rez (2005), we calculated the log-deviation from a quadratic trend.
We also smooth the real exchange rate using a 7 month moving average to remove
short-term noise in the real exchange rate.
To avoid stochastic singularity, we use measurement errors for output, inflation
and the export/import ratio. To generate the parameter chain, we use the tai-
lored randomized Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method proposed by Chib
and Ramamurthy (2010). The simple model reproduces the stylized facts of the
Swedish economy in the 1930s reasonably well. Figure 6 compares data with me-
13We abstract from financial market incompleteness, as this plays no role in our proposed
explanation.
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dian predictions of the model. The dynamics implied by the estimated structural
shocks for the four observed variables fit in a satisfactory way. By construction,
the real exchange rate is matched perfectly,14 and therefore not reported here.
We have also added a measure for annual world output not used in the estimation
procedure for comparison. Plotting the estimated world demand shock against
an annual world manufacturing index taken from the historical data on interna-
tional merchandise trade statistics published by the United Nations, we find that
our estimated shock mimics the actual movements almost perfectly.
Figure 6: Model Fit
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To evaluate the effect of the Krona devaluation we use a counterfactual in which
the Krona is not devalued. To this end, we adjust the exogenous process that
models the domestic price of foreign goods, which includes the change in the
14Because of the absence of a measurement error in the measurement equation for the real
exchange rate. This facilitates our counterfactual analysis later.
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nominal exchange rate. We set it to be consistent with the real exchange rate
that would have been the result if the nominal Krona-Sterling rate would have
been stuck at the September 1931 value. The consequence would have been that
instead of being undervalued after 1932, the Swedish currency would have been
constantly overvalued as displayed in the lower left panel of Figure 7.
Figure 7: Counterfactual Experiment
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Data Counterfactual
The new real exchange rate is accompanied by a considerable drop in economic
activity from 1932 onwards. In 1932 we see a massive recession which is much
more severe then the actual observed, for Depression standards rather modest,
decline in industrial production. The strong recovery in net exports evaporates,
but still, the economy recovers with the recuperating world economy after 1933.
Without the depreciation we observe no exit from deflation. Looking deeper into
inflation dynamics, Figure 8 zooms into the depreciation episode.
Between 1931 and 1934 the model implied one year-ahead inflation expectations
follow closely the movement of the nominal exchange rate and briefly venture back
into positive territory in 1932 when the nominal exchange rate was at its weak-
est level, but actual inflation was still negative. When the Swedish authorities
19
unnecessarily tried to bring the Krona back to the old parity inflation expecta-
tion are again pushed sightly below zero. However, this is in sharp contrast to
our counterfactual scenario. In the counterfactual scenario inflation expectations
remain firmly in negative territory, as shown in the center panel of Figure 8.
Figure 8: Inflation Expectations
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There are some points to mention. On the one hand, our scenario represents a
lower bound for the effect as there would have been a further appreciation of the
real effective exchange rate when the USA abandoned the Gold Standard in 1933
which we have not considered here. On the other hand, inflation would have been
lower without depreciation and hence the target real exchange rate would have
20
depreciated somewhat.
5 Conclusion
Sweden was among the first economies to recover from the depression in the early
1930s, and it did so in a particularly impressive way. We test the contribution
made to this recovery by Sweden’s monetary policy. Building on Lundberg (1983),
who claimed on the basis of descriptive statistics that Sweden consciously kept its
currency undervalued vis-a`-vis the British pound, we apply a DSGE model for a
small open economy. Our results show that Sweden’s exchange rate policy in fact
had a strong impact on the course of recovery. Our counterfactual simulations
indicate that that the depreciation of the krona prevented a much deeper and pro-
longed downturn in economic activity. The devaluation also changed inflationary
expectations almost immediately.
This finding contributes to the ongoing discussion about alternative monetary
policy frameworks. The Riksbank in the 1930s has been seen as an example of
a relatively innovative central bank in terms of the conduct of monetary policy.
We argue instead that this view overvalues the official declarations of Swedish
officials. Before and after the suspension of the gold standard in 1931, the Riks-
bank was determined to have a stable currency, believing that it was a necessary
condition for international trade and not just an intermediate target for monetary
policy. Furthermore, the Riksbank’s main motivation behind the strong under-
valuation of the krona was the need to replenish its foreign exchange reserves,
not the stabilization of the domestic price level. Crafts and Fearon (2013) have
made the point that the policy framework adopted by the British Treasury from
mid-1932 fulfilled the so-called “foolproof way” of escaping from the liquidity trap
(Svensson, 2003). By pursuing a cheap-money policy, announcing a price-level
target well above the current one and engineering a marked undervaluation of
the pound, the UK was able to enjoy a strong economic recovery in the 1930s.
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Sweden was in a similar position as the UK, but fulfills only two of the three con-
ditions listed by Crafts and Fearon (2013). In particular, the Swedish monetary
authorities never announced a price level well above the current one, whereas the
British Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain declared in mid-1932
that prices should rise to the level of 1929. This observation can be seen as a
further piece of evidence supporting our argument that it was the involuntary,
but clear break with the gold standard that signaled the end of deflation and
helped Sweden overcome the depression more rapidly than other countries.
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